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Most scholarship on the Dartmouth College case falls into two broad categories.  
One category focuses on its role in the emerging legal treatment of business 
corporations.1  Another category emphasizes that its legal differentiation of private 
from public universities promoted the transformation of American institutions of 
higher education, which had previously combined what later became identified as 
private and public features, into structurally dissimilar private and public 
universities.2  Ironically, relatively little scholarship has explored the implications of 
the Dartmouth College decision for the legal regulation of higher education. That 
topic is the context in which the case arose and the subject of this article.  Analyzing 
the Dartmouth College decision itself and subsequent decisions that cited it while 
addressing a fascinating variety of legal disputes at universities, I will focus on two 
related issues that remain vitally important in the 21st century:  (1) the extent of 
university independence from regulation by the state, and (2) the extent to which 
that independence depends on the public or private status of the university. 
From the Dartmouth College case to the present, courts have recognized that 
institutional independence from the state promotes public interests in education.  
They have provided more independence to private universities, but they have also 
recognized that in some circumstances even public universities should be sheltered 
from the state that created them.  At the same time, courts have identified state 
interests that justify regulation of private, as well as public, universities.  The legal 
concepts used to analyze these issues have changed over time.  The constitutional 
provision precluding the “impairment of contracts” was the primary conceptual tool 
in the Dartmouth College case itself.3   The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
after the Civil War prompted its prohibition against various forms of “state action” 
to become the doctrinal vehicle for differentiating public from private universities 
and for determining their respective rights against the state.  Judicial decisions in 
 
1  See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 174–75 (1973); Morton J. 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 136–37 (1977); Morton J. 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 11, 67, 106, 206 (1992); J. Willard 
Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 
66 (1956); William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-
Century America 106–08 (1996); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural 
Change 1815-1835 627–28 (1988). 
2  See, e.g., John S. Whitehead & Jurgen Herbst, How to Think About the Dartmouth College Case, 26 
Hist. of Educ. Q. 333 (1986); Eldon L. Johnson, The Dartmouth College Case: The Neglected Educational 
Meaning, 3 J. of the Early Republic 45 (1983); George Thomas, Rethinking the Dartmouth College 
Case in American Political Development: Constituting Public and Private Educational Institutions, 29 
Stud. in American Pol. Dev. 23 (2015). 
3  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 588–96 (1819) [hereinafter Dartmouth]. 
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recent decades declaring that universities have institutional rights of academic 
freedom protected by the First Amendment have provided an important new 
constitutional barrier to state regulation. 
Henry Friendly, the eminent federal judge, lectured at Dartmouth College in 
1968 during its celebration of the sesquicentennial of the famous oral argument in 
the Dartmouth College case by its distinguished alumnus, Daniel Webster.  Judge 
Friendly used the occasion to propose a new interpretation of the “state action” 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Asserting that Justice John Marshall’s 
opinion in Dartmouth College drew too bright a line between private and public while 
construing the impairment of contracts clause, Judge Friendly suggested a more 
flexible approach to this distinction in determining the existence of state action.4  
Following Judge Friendly’s example in the context of state action, at the end of this 
article I will use another anniversary of the Dartmouth College decision to suggest 
flexibility in applying the First Amendment’s protection of institutional academic 
freedom to public and private universities. 
I .  T HE  D A R T M O U T H  C O L L E G E  DE CI S I ON  
Amendments by the New Hampshire legislature to the original charter of 
Dartmouth College provoked the litigation that ultimately reached the United 
States Supreme Court.  The amendments gave the governor power to appoint 
members to an enlarged board of trustees and to a new board of overseers with 
control over the trustees.5  The existing trustees challenged this legislation in state 
court.  The court rejected their claim that the amendments constituted an 
unconstitutional impairment of the contract created by the original charter.  The 
impairment of contracts clause, it maintained, was clearly intended to protect 
private rights of property, not to limit the power of states over “civil institutions,”6  
such as “public corporations.”  The key question for the court, therefore, was 
whether Dartmouth College was a private or a public corporation.7  Based on its 
reading of the original charter of Dartmouth College from the British King in 1769, 
the court stated that it “was founded for the purpose of ‘spreading the knowledge of 
the great Redeemer’ among the savages and of furnishing ‘the best means of 
 
4  H. Friendly, The Dartmouth Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, XII, No. 2 Texas Quarterly 
10–11 (1971). 
5  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 626. 
6  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 132 (1817) [hereinafter Woodward]. 
7  Id. at 115. 
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education’ to the province of New-Hampshire.”8  These purposes, the court 
concluded, are clearly matters of substantial public concern in which the trustees 
have no greater interest than any other members of the community.9 
The decision concluded by emphasizing that its legal analysis promoted the 
public interest in education.  After highlighting the need to maintain the “just rights 
and privileges” of universities, the court expressed concern about the unchecked 
power of university trustees.10  Higher education, the court reasoned, “is a matter of 
too great moment, too intimately connected with the public welfare and 
prosperity,” to be entrusted to the “absolute control of a few individuals, and out of 
the control of the sovereign power.”11  It warned that independent trustees:  
will ultimately forget that their office is a public trust—will at length consider these 
institutions as their own—will overlook the great purposes for which their powers were 
originally given, and will exercise them only to gratify their own private views and 
wishes, or to promote the narrow purposes of a sect or a party.12   
Interestingly, the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom, the 
foundational document of the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) and still the most influential theoretical analysis of academic freedom in the 
United States, used very similar language in addressing the dangers posed by 
university trustees, although there is no evidence of any borrowing from this 
decision.  Asserting that private as well as public universities constitute a “public 
trust,” the Declaration stressed that their trustees are “trustees for the public.”13  
After acknowledging that many university trustees fulfilled this role, the 
Declaration observed that many did not, but instead used their legal power to 
dismiss faculty “to gratify their private antipathies or resentments.”14  The New 
Hampshire court conceded that legislative power, like any power, may be unwisely 
exercised, but concluded that there was no better alternative: “If those whom the 
people annually elect to manage their public affairs, cannot be trusted,” it asked 
rhetorically, “who can?”15 
 
8  Id. at 119. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 135. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 136. 
13  American Association of University Professors, The 1915 Declaration of Principles, in 
Academic Freedom and Tenure: A Handbook of the American Association of University 
Professors 155, 160 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967). 
14  Id. 
15  Woodward, 1 N.H. at 137. 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed.  Chief Justice Marshall’s majority 
opinion agreed with the New Hampshire court that the impairment of contracts 
clause applies only to private property and not to “civil institutions,” but he 
disagreed with its conclusion that Dartmouth College was a civil institution.  He 
acknowledged that “education is an object of national concern, and a proper subject 
of legislation.”16  A legislature could create a university entirely under its control, 
which would be a civil institution.  But he rejected the claim that all colleges are civil 
institutions simply because their general purpose is education.  This position, he 
pointed out, would treat education as an exclusive function of government, making 
all teachers public officers, all donations public property, and the will of the 
legislature paramount to the will of the donor.17  He observed that Dartmouth 
College was funded entirely from private donations at the time of its founding and 
incorporation,18 and denied that a charter of incorporation from the state 
automatically creates a civil institution.19  He doubted that any private donor would 
endow a college if the state could control its funds immediately upon 
incorporation.20  Having determined that Dartmouth College was a private rather 
than a civil institution, Marshall concluded that the New Hampshire legislation 
violated the impairment of contracts clause by transferring control of the college 
from the self-perpetuating private board of trustees guaranteed by the original 
charter to “a machine entirely subservient to the will of the government.”21 
While reaching a different constitutional conclusion than the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall similarly maintained that his legal analysis 
promoted the interests of higher education and that those interests require 
freedom from external interference.  But whereas the New Hampshire court 
worried about interference from self-interested trustees, Marshall referred to the 
pernicious influence of legislative bodies “whose fluctuating policy and repeated 
interferences, produced the most perplexing and injurious embarrassments.”22  In 
contrast to the New Hampshire court, which recognized the potential abuse of 
legislative power while concluding that it posed a lesser threat to universities than 
the trustees, Marshall did not address the potential abuse of power by trustees even 
 
16  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 634. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 633. 
19  Id. at 638–39. 
20  Id. at 647.  
21  Id. at 653. 
22  Id. at 648. 
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as a lesser threat than legislative interference.  Justice Joseph Story’s concurring 
opinion did respond to this concern by pointing out that a court of equity has 
jurisdiction to remedy abuses of trust and can even remove the trust and vest it in 
others.23  The New Hampshire court, by contrast, had denied the efficacy of judicial 
review, claiming that many abuses by trustees can be corrected “by the sovereign 
power alone.”24  
Story’s concurring opinion is particularly helpful in elaborating Marshall’s 
conclusion that the public interest in education does not justify categorizing all 
universities as civil institutions.  He acknowledged that “in a certain sense, every 
charity, which is extensive in its reach, may be called a public charity, in 
contradistinction to a charity embracing but a few definite objects.”25  Under this 
interpretation, he observed, a university is a public charity whenever it offers its 
charitable purpose of promoting learning and piety to a broad community.26  But he 
stressed that a public charity is often a private corporation.  The assumption that 
“because the charity is public, the corporation is public,” he declared, “manifestly 
confounds the popular with the strictly legal sense of the terms.”27  In the legal sense, 
a public corporation means more than “that the whole community may be the 
proper objects of the bounty, but that the government have the sole right, as trustees 
of the public interests, to regulate, control and direct the corporation, and its funds 
and its franchises, at its own good will and pleasure.”28  A public corporation, he 
added, must be “the exclusive property and domain of the government itself.”29 
Story maintained that the original charter for Dartmouth College created a 
private corporation endowed with legal perpetuity and subject to governance by a 
board of trustees whose successors would be appointed by the existing board.30  
Under the terms of the charter, the land and property held and subsequently 
acquired by the board, including from the states of Vermont and New Hampshire, 
were for the use of Dartmouth College in promoting piety and learning, not for the 
more general use of the people of New Hampshire.31  Story observed that the charter 
 
23  Id. at 676–77. 
24  Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 136 (1817). 
25  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 670. 
26  Id. at 669. 
27  Id. at 671. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 672. 
30  Id. at 681–82. 
31  Id. at 702. 
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provided no endowment from the crown and did not reserve any power of 
amendment in the crown.32  This charter, Story reasoned, created an implied 
contract between the crown and every benefactor to Dartmouth College “that the 
crown would not revoke or alter the charter, or change its administration, without 
the consent of the corporation.”33  The American Revolution, he added, did not alter 
the validity of the original charter.34 
Despite the disagreement between the New Hampshire court and the Supreme 
Court about the application of the impairment of contracts clause, the Dartmouth 
College litigation revealed two key areas of agreement that would continue to be 
endorsed by American courts in cases arising at colleges and universities.  Both 
courts stressed that higher education serves the vital social function of diffusing 
knowledge, which is essential to the effective operation of American society.  Both 
also stressed that external interference can jeopardize the ability of universities to 
perform this central institutional function.  Their differing interpretations of the 
impairment of contracts clause reflected their disagreement over the source of the 
greatest threats to the necessary independence of universities.  Viewing trustees as 
the greatest threat, the New Hampshire court did not construe the clause as a 
barrier to legislative checks on their power.  Viewing legislators as the greatest 
threat, the Supreme Court construed it to limit their ability to intervene in 
university affairs. 
I I .  DE CI S I ONS  F OL L OWI NG T HE  D A R T M O U T H  C O L L E G E  C AS E  
Throughout the 19th century, subsequent decisions about universities cited the 
Dartmouth College case while reinforcing and elaborating its holding.  They 
expanded the definition of a private college, and restricted the ability of trustees 
themselves to deviate from the purposes of the original charter.  They upheld the 
power of states to create and control public universities, but they identified 
circumstances in which states granted substantial autonomy even to these 
universities.  Decisions also upheld state laws of general applicability that restricted 
both private and public universities whose charters guaranteed independence to 
make educational decisions. 
In an 1833 opinion holding that the Maine legislature violated the impairment 
of contracts clause by firing the president of Bowdoin College, Story, sitting as a 
Circuit Justice, relied heavily on the Dartmouth College decision.  The fact that 
 
32  Id. at 680. 
33  Id. at 689. 
34  Id. at 706–07. 
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Bowdoin, unlike Dartmouth, had received its original funding from the state made 
no difference to Story.  The state, he pointed out, can choose to fund private as well 
as public corporations.35  He also observed that Bowdoin College, as its charter 
permitted, had subsequently received money from private donors.36  Story conceded 
that the Dartmouth College decision allowed a state to reserve rights to intervene in a 
private college, and that Bowdoin’s charter, unlike Dartmouth’s, gave substantial 
power to the legislature.  But he asserted that this admittedly “very broad” power 
was not “unlimited” and did not extend to the right to fire the president.37  Although 
the Bowdoin board of trustees had “acquiesced” in the legislature’s decision, Story 
maintained that it could not “give effect to an unconstitutional act” and abrogate its 
contract with the president.38  At the end of his opinion, Story expressed regret that 
the dispute had reached the judiciary.  While emphasizing the importance of the 
vested rights of private colleges, he also recognized the “extreme difficulty” of 
operating one without the support of the state, which might be reluctant to provide 
funds when it does not have confidence in the president.39  He clearly hoped that his 
legal analysis would not undermine continued state support of private universities 
that were largely beyond the state’s power to control. 
Other decisions followed Story’s reasoning in the Bowdoin College case.  A 
Kentucky appellate court in 1855 found that the endowment provided by the City of 
Louisville did not make the University of Louisville a public corporation.  The court 
emphasized that the charter establishing the university did not give the city any 
rights to intervene in its management or to revoke the endowment.  If the city had 
wanted its donation to give it control over the university, the court observed, it 
should have bargained for that power in the charter before it made the donation.  
Otherwise, the law treats donations to universities from municipal corporations no 
differently than donations from private individuals.40  The court invalidated as an 
unconstitutional impairment of contract41 a new charter enacted by the City of 
Louisville that provided for popular election of an entirely new and enlarged board 
of trustees.42 
 
35  Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 489, 497 (C.C.D. Me. 1833). 
36  Id. at 498. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 502. 
39  Id. at 503–04. 
40  Louisville v. President and Trustees of the Univ. of Louisville, 54 Ky. 642, 679 (Ct. App. Ky. 
1855). 
41  Id. at 694. 
42  Id. at 663–67. 
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Reiterating that subsequent ratification by a university’s trustees cannot 
validate legislative amendments that are inconsistent with the institution’s charter, 
a decision by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1869 stated that trustees “can govern 
only according to the conditions of the foundation.”43  The court held that a 
legislative amendment requiring the concurrence of “an ecclesiastical body 
representing one of the religious denominations of the State” in the choice of 
college trustees was an unconstitutional impairment of contract because it 
endangered the purpose of the college set forth in its charter.44  The court 
characterized this purpose “as an institution purely literary, affording instruction 
in ancient and modern languages, the sciences and the liberal arts, and not 
including or supporting by its funds any department for instruction in systematic 
or polemic theology.”45  Yet it stressed that the decision did not absolutely prohibit 
any modifications to the original provisions of a college charter, asserting that 
“strict adherence to all the formal requirements of a foundation might defeat its 
object,”46 and observing that trustees have a right to alter the curriculum of a college 
based on changes in the conditions of knowledge.  It maintained that “if in centuries 
past the founder of a college had enumerated alchemy and astrology among its 
studies, the study of chemistry and astronomy might be deemed a truer compliance 
with the object of the charity.”47 
As Story had pointed out in his Dartmouth College opinion, the requirement that 
trustees adhere to the original purposes of the trust, while functioning as a check 
on legislative interference with universities permitted judges to intervene in 
university affairs if they determined that the existing board had deviated from those 
purposes.48  In 1925, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invalidated a plan 
for a closer affiliation between the Andover Theological Seminary and the Harvard 
Divinity School because it would have transformed Andover into a different 
institution than contemplated by its founders.  Emphasizing that Andover was 
established in 1805 to protest the dominance of Unitarianism at Harvard, the court 
described Andover’s founding document as displaying “a settled and deliberate 
purpose to confine the donation to the maintenance of an institution for the 
 
43  State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, 582 (1869). 
44  Id. at 578. 
45  Id. at 574. 
46  Id. at 581. 
47  Id. 
48  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. 518, 676 (1819). 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
18 
propagation of Calvinist orthodox trinitarianism.”49 Because the document did not 
provide for significant modifications to these religious principles, the court 
considered itself obligated to enforce them despite evidence that the differences 
between trinitarians and unitarians had dissipated so much over the intervening 
hundred years that were only matters of historical interest.50   In an article entitled 
Education and the Dead Hand, written a few years before this decision, the great 
scholar of trust law,  Austin Scott, acknowledged that college trustees cannot deviate 
from the purposes of the original trust.  But he urged courts to approve changes 
made by trustees that “are not unreasonable in view of the general purposes of the 
donors and of the changes that time has brought to pass,” such as the elimination 
of religious requirements.51  He worried that courts would construe the Dartmouth 
College decision more rigidly than it required, which would “eventually create an 
intolerable situation” by obstructing valuable “educational reform.”52 
While many subsequent decisions elaborated the distinction between private 
and public universities in the Dartmouth College case to create a broad definition of 
private universities, other courts applied the distinction to identify public 
universities over which the state had substantial control.  In 1871, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri differentiated Dartmouth College, a “private corporation,” from 
the State University of Missouri.  In founding the state university, the legislature 
established its own institution, “a public corporation for educational purposes,” and 
“provided for its control and government, through its own agents and appointees.”53  
The power vested in the board of curators “was made subject to the pleasure of the 
Legislature.”54  In contrast to the origins of Dartmouth College, the court observed, 
the legislature did not contract with private parties in creating the university, so 
there was no contract to impair.55  Just as some cases held that public funding did 
not make private universities public, this decision held that private contributions to 
the university’s original building fund did not make a public university private.56  
Finding that the legislature had the power to pass a law firing the entire faculty, the 
court denied a professor’s suit for lost salary.  The Supreme Court of Wyoming used 
 
49  Trustees of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors of Theological Inst. in Phillips Academy 
in Andover, 253 Mass. 256, 265 (1925). 
50  Id. at 294. 
51  Austin W. Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1920). 
52  Id. at 19. 
53  Head v. Curators of the Univ. of the State of Mo., 47 Mo. 220, 224–25 (1871). 
54  Id. at 224. 
55  Id. at 225–26. 
56  Id. at 225–26. 
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similar reasoning in 1906 to find that the Wyoming Agricultural College met the 
definition of a public university in the Dartmouth College case.  The court, therefore, 
upheld the power of the state legislature to close this institution.57  Decisions in 
other states held that legislatures had the power to remove the boards of trustees of 
public universities and appoint successors.58 
Occasionally, courts indicated constraints on the power of state legislatures 
even over public universities.  Not all universities that are “public corporations,” the 
Supreme Court of Alabama held in 1905, are “under the absolute control of the state.”  
The court found that the charter of the Medical College of Alabama, a public 
corporation, gave its self-perpetuating board of trustees entire control over its 
management.  The board could change the curriculum or close the college entirely, 
although the legislature could amend the charter to place the Medical College under 
its absolute control.59  In 1879, the Supreme Court of California quoted from the 
legislation creating the University of California, which provided that each college 
within the university could regulate its own affairs, including the curriculum and 
teaching materials.60  While not necessary to the resolution of the case before it, the 
court seemed to interpret this language as a grant of power over these subjects by 
the legislature to the university. 
Although courts provided substantial independence from legislative control to 
private and even to some public universities, decisions also upheld general 
legislation that both private and public universities challenged as illegal 
interference in their internal affairs.  In 1838, a Maryland appellate court rejected 
the claim by the board of trustees of the University of Maryland that legislation 
establishing a state board of examiners to license physicians violated the charter 
granting the college of medicine the authority to award diplomas and certificates to 
practice medicine.  The court concluded that the legislation was a “general police 
regulation” within the “political power” of the state, which was enacted “to shield 
the community from the pernicious effects of the ignorance of unskillful 
pretenders.”61  Nothing in the charter of the medical school, the court stressed, 
indicated that the state gave up and transferred this “inviolable right to that political 
power.”62 
 
57  State ex rel. Wyo. Agric. Coll. v. Irvine, 84 P. 90, 96–97, 108 (Wyo. 1906). 
58  See, e.g., Lewis v. Whittle, 77 Va. 415, 424 (Va. 1883); State v. Knowles, 16 Fla. 577, 596 (Fla. 1878); 
Univ. of N.C. v. Maultsby, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 257, 263–64 (N.C. 1852). 
59  State ex rel. Med. Coll. of Ala. v. Sowell, 143 Ala. 494, 500–01 (Ala. 1905). 
60  Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28, 32 (1879). 
61  Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 390–91 (Md. 1838). 
62  Id. at 391. 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in its 1869 decision finding that 
legislation introducing ecclesiastical influence violated the original charter of a 
college, rejected the claim by the college trustees that the legislation also violated 
the charter by requiring an oath of loyalty to the union during the Civil War.  The 
“duty of loyalty,” the court reasoned, “is antecedent, perpetual, paramount—and in 
granting a charter the State can make no engagement to dispense with that duty.”63 
In its 1879 decision recognizing the substantial autonomy of the University of 
California over its educational decisions, the Supreme Court of California 
interpreted legislation in the state’s “political code,” which provided that “words 
used in the masculine gender comprehend as well the feminine gender,” as giving 
females the right to attend the University of California.64  The court rejected the 
claim by the board of the University’s Hastings College of Law that the requirement 
to admit women violated its power under the charter to admit students.65  While 
acknowledging that this power includes discretion to determine “who, for any 
sufficient reason, ought not to be admitted,” the court denied that the board had 
unlimited discretion to violate general laws and to reject any student “who does not 
possess some qualification arbitrarily selected by them.”66 
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in 1908 that a state law prohibiting integrated 
classes did not violate the charter granting Berea College authority to educate “all 
persons”67 is another example of how judicial enforcement of general legislation 
limited institutional independence.  The college, which taught integrated classes, 
was convicted for violating this law and fined $1000.68  The majority reasoned that 
the law only separated the students “by time and place of instruction,” which did not 
prevent the College from furnishing an education to all of them.69 
I I I .  S T AT E  AC T I ON  
In the decades following World War II, the distinction between private and 
public universities introduced in the Dartmouth College case became crucial in 
judicial interpretation of the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Ratified in 1868 in response to the Civil War, the Fourteenth 
 
63  State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, 584 (1869). 
64  Foltz, 54 Cal. at 35. 
65  Id. at 32. 
66  Id. at 34. 
67  Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 56 (1908).  
68  Id. at 53. 
69  Id. at 57. 
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Amendment provided that “[n]o State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”70  After Supreme Court decisions following World 
War II expanded the concept of “state action” subject to the restrictions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, judges analyzed whether nominally private universities 
had engaged in “state action.”  Several decisions observed that the distinction 
between private and public universities introduced in the Dartmouth College case 
remained crucial in determining the existence of state action.  More specifically, 
some of the same factors 20th century courts rejected as indicators of state action 
had been rejected as indicators of public university status in the Dartmouth College 
case and subsequent decisions interpreting the impairment of contracts clause. 
Although Judge Friendly urged a more flexible interpretation of “state action” 
than the rigid distinction between private and public institutions set forth by 
Marshall while construing the impairment of contracts clause in the Dartmouth 
College case, shortly after his lecture he wrote a decision denying that the grant of 
state property to assist in the construction of a law school converted it from a private 
to a public institution.   He pointed out that the Dartmouth College case, “although 
not, of course, directly in the context of ‘state action,’” was the first important 
decision that differentiated private from public universities, and that the 
substantial grants of land to Dartmouth by the states of Vermont and New 
Hampshire did not prevent the Court from concluding that Dartmouth was a 
private university.71  Without referring again to the Dartmouth College decision, 
Friendly also maintained that the “public function” of universities in offering 
education does not constitute “state action.” This reasoning resembles the 
conclusion of Justices Marshall and Story that the public interest in higher 
education does not make universities public institutions.72  Citing the Dartmouth 
College case, other decisions denied that public funding for programs and capital 
expenditures,73 the general public interest in higher education,74 or the receipt of a 
charter from the state75 subjected universities to the requirements of state action.  
Because courts did not find state action under these circumstances, they did not 
address the constitutional claims by a professor that he was fired in retaliation for 
 
70  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
71  Grafton v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 478 F.2d 1137, 1141 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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73  Remy v. Howard Univ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28–29 (D.D.C. 1999). 
74  Carr v. St. John’s Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
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articles he had published,76 or by students that they were dismissed for their 
unpopular speech77 or free exercise of religion.78  In a rare decision concluding that 
a previously private university had become public and, therefore, within the scope 
of state action, a judge found that Temple University had been integrated into the 
state system of higher education.  Based on this finding, he reversed the summary 
judgment against professors who claimed that the university dismissed them for 
exercising rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Discussing the 
Dartmouth College decision at length, the judge conceded that a college does not 
become a public institution simply because the state charters it or conveys real 
property to it.  But he maintained that if Dartmouth had received the amount of 
funding provided to Temple by the state of Pennsylvania, Marshall would have 
characterized Dartmouth as a public institution.79 
I V.  I NS T I T UT I ONAL  AC ADE MI C  F R E E DOM 
  Just as Judge Friendly used a previous anniversary of the Dartmouth College case 
to propose a flexible interpretation of the distinction between private and public 
institutions in defining the “state action” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
I will close by proposing that this distinction should sometimes, but not always, 
influence interpretation of the First Amendment right of institutional academic 
freedom.  Understandably, scholarly and judicial discussion of institutional 
academic freedom generally do not differentiate between public and private 
universities.  Government funding,80 like government employment,81 does not 
extinguish First Amendment rights to academic freedom.  Correspondingly, 
scholarship and legal decisions do not differentiate between public and private 
universities while recognizing government interests that can outweigh 
institutional academic freedom, such as national security, public health, and the 
protection of constitutional rights to free speech and statutory rights against 
employment discrimination.  Yet I believe that on some matters that have 
educational implications the state has more legitimate control over its own 
universities than over private ones, leaving public universities with less 
institutional academic freedom. 
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Institutional academic freedom should protect public as well as private 
universities from legislation that regulates the content of teaching and scholarship.  
The classic early Supreme Court cases that identified academic freedom as a First 
Amendment right arose at state universities.  They convincingly asserted that the 
First Amendment prohibits legislation requiring disclosure of the contents of a 
classroom lecture82 or interfering with the assignment and classroom discussion of 
controversial views.83  It is in this context that Justice Felix Frankfurter laid the 
foundation for the First Amendment right to institutional academic freedom by 
emphasizing that “the dependence of a free society on free universities” requires 
“the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university.”84  
Legislation prohibiting universities from teaching evolution85 or requiring them to 
teach “creation science”86 should similarly be deemed violations of institutional 
academic freedom at both public and private universities because they preempt the 
expertise of peer review in determining whether a theory meets academic 
standards.  Legislation that conditions research grants to professors and 
universities on the right of government officials to approve publication also violates 
the institutional academic freedom of both public and private universities.  The 
federal case that raised this issue arose at Stanford,87 a private university, but the 
result should not be different at the public University of California.  In addition to 
safeguarding teaching and scholarship, First Amendment academic freedom 
should protect the institutional right of public as well as private universities to select 
faculty and students on academic grounds without state interference. 
Just as First Amendment academic freedom should protect some core 
educational functions of both public and private universities from state 
interference, some state interests are substantial enough to justify laws that 
constrain both public and private universities even though educational functions 
may be affected.  State interests in national security may justify laws restricting 
dissemination of academic research that would reveal the details of military 
operations during wartime or how to produce dangerous weapons.  State interests 
in public health may justify laws restricting research using toxic chemicals or 
endangering human subjects.  State interests in preventing discrimination may 
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justify laws limiting university discretion over student admissions and faculty 
employment.  State interests in protecting peaceful expression or in preventing 
incitement to unlawful violence may justify laws regulating campus speech.  State 
interests in preventing fraud may justify state scrutiny of the educational claims 
and programs of universities.  More controversial assertions of state interests have 
arisen in connection with federal legislation denying funds to universities that 
restrict military recruitment88 and state legislation permitting concealed weapons 
in class,89 but the weight of the state interests in these cases does not vary between 
public and private universities. 
Other state interests, by contrast, seem within the state’s authority to regulate 
public, but not private, universities.  State legislators often fund various institutions 
of higher education with quite different goals and programs, including research 
universities, community colleges, liberal arts colleges, agricultural universities, and 
medical schools.  Insufficient legislative funding can lead to the elimination of 
faculty positions, and legislatures can decide to end funding entirely for institutions 
of higher education they previously established.  These legislative decisions clearly 
limit the freedom of state colleges and universities to determine “who may teach,” 
“what may be taught,” and “who may be admitted to study,” which courts have 
recognized as key elements of academic freedom.90  Yet no one has ever maintained 
that these decisions violate a public university’s institutional academic freedom, 
and it is difficult to imagine convincing arguments that they do.  A legislature’s 
determination of the kinds of institutions of higher education and the extent of 
their funding seems clearly within its legitimate power.  These arguments for 
legislative authority do not apply to private universities, whose decisions about their 
educational goals and programs should be protected by institutional academic 
freedom from state interference. 
Some states require that certain courses be taught in its public universities.  The 
Texas education code, for example, requires that all its public universities offer a 
course covering the United States and Texas constitutions91 and a course in 
American history.92  Imposing these course requirements clearly affects “what may 
be taught.”  But just as the legislative designation of an “agricultural” university 
 
88  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Individual Rights, Inc. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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affects “what may be taught” without violating institutional academic freedom, I 
think the imposition of particular courses to promote the public interest in civic 
education is a legitimate interest of a state legislature that does not violate the 
institutional academic freedom of a state university.  The state interest in civic 
education, by contrast, seems weaker with respect to private universities, which 
should have more discretion in determining for themselves the values they wish to 
promote.  Requiring that public universities enroll at least a certain percentage of 
state residents in each entering class of students similarly seems a legitimate 
legislative regulation even though it constrains the university’s ability to select its 
student body on academic grounds.  The state has a strong interest in spending its 
money to educate its own residents, an interest that does not apply to privately 
funded universities within the state. 
Either in prohibiting or requiring affirmative action, I think a legislature 
should be able to regulate public more than private universities.  Affirmative action 
raises broad issues of public policy that are matters of legitimate legislative concern.  
While I agree with Justice Lewis F. Powell’s famous opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke93 that the institutional academic freedom of 
universities, including public ones, should include the right to make decisions about 
the educational value of affirmative action, I do not think a public university should 
be able to invoke this right if the state has legislated on this subject.  No such 
legislation existed at the time of the Bakke case in 1978, and Justice Powell’s opinion 
did not reach this issue.  Subsequent cases have upheld state laws prohibiting 
affirmative action in public universities,94 and judges should similarly uphold state 
laws that require it.  By contrast, because I think there is less public interest in the 
affirmative action policies of private universities, I would recognize their 
institutional academic freedom to make educational policy on this issue free from 
state interference.  Under this analysis, a state law on affirmative action could be 
valid as applied to public universities but unconstitutional as applied to private 
universities. 
Examples could easily be multiplied, but I hope these are sufficient to 
demonstrate the complexity of assessing university claims that the First 
Amendment right of institutional academic freedom precludes government 
regulation.  These examples should also illustrate that the importance of the 
distinction between public and private universities in determining the extent of 
their independence from the state, which was at the core of the analysis in the 
Dartmouth College case, remains significant two hundred years later. 
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